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A B S T R AC T . This article revisits the late seventeenth-century histories of two of England’s most
successful overseas trading monopolies, the East India and Royal African Companies. It offers the
ﬁrst full account of the various enforcement powers and strategies that both companies developed
and stresses their unity of purpose in the seventeenth century. It assesses the complex effects that the
‘Glorious Revolution’ had on these powers and strategies, unearthing much new material about
the case law for monopoly enforcement in this critical period and revising existing accounts that
continue to assert the Revolution’s exclusively deregulating effects and that miss crucial subtleties in
the case law and related alterations in company behaviour. It asks why the two companies parted
company as legal and political entities and offers an explanation that connects the fortunes of both
monopoly companies to their public proﬁle and differing constituencies in the English empire and the
varying non-European political contexts in which they operated.
In September , England’s two East India Companies united under the
terms of an award made by the lord treasurer, Sidney Godolphin. Coming as
it did after over a decade of concentrated political and commercial rivalry in
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London and in Asia between them, Godolphin’s conspicuous part in the
uniﬁcation (as well as the company’s loans to the government) conﬁrmed
the company’s willing subordination to the interest of the British state. The state
and Godolphin would show less interest in its other large-scale overseas trading
corporation, the Royal African Company. Just a few weeks after Godolphin’s
award, he offered the following indictment: ‘The African Company has been
managed from a great many years by a pack of knaves . . . who have cheated all
their adventurers.’ Godolphin objected to the company’s ‘present foundation
which is in my opinion a very rotten one’. Since the Glorious Revolution, the
Royal African Company, like its East Indian counterpart, had been subject to
prolonged legal, constitutional, and public-parliamentary assaults on its charter
right to monopolize access to speciﬁc arenas of overseas trade. For the East
India Company, the Godolphin award that brought this political interrogation
to an end heralded a new period of stability and ﬁnancial and commercial
consolidation. For the Royal African Company, the interrogation led to
ﬁnancial collapse and commercial impotence, while the resulting greatly
expanded transatlantic slave trade proceeded with little state oversight.
Why then did the Glorious Revolution deal such different outcomes to
the two companies? To answer that question, this article offers the ﬁrst
comparison of their late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century legal and
political histories. Both had enjoyed close relationships with Kings Charles II
and James II as they energetically used their prerogative to help the companies
enforce their monopolies. Neither company’s enforcement powers proved
entirely reliable during the second half of the seventeenth century, but both
companies proved themselves largely able to satisfy the interests of their
shareholders. Both companies’ monopolies proved controversial in similar
ways: as inhibitors of economic opportunity, as price ﬁxers, and as despotic
intruders into politics. Contemporaries believed, correctly in our view, that their
successes in the seventeenth century owed much to the shared legal and
broader constitutional supports provided for them by the royal prerogative.
This is evidenced by the fact that their opponents bitterly fought such
authority. The article offers the ﬁrst full account of the later seventeenth-
century struggle over the monopolies’ enforcement powers. It then explores the
Glorious Revolution’s dramatically different implications for the companies by
concentrating ﬁrst on the courtroom tests each monopoly faced and then
comparing the companies’ differing political environments both in England
and abroad.
 ‘Lord Godolphin to the duchess of Marlborough,  October ’, in Henry L Snyder,
ed., The Marlborough–Godolphin correspondence ( vols., Oxford, ), I, p. .
 William Robert Scott, The constitution and ﬁnance of English, Scottish, and Irish joint stock
monopoly companies to  ( vols., Cambridge, –), II, p. ; Nuala Zahedieh,
‘Regulation, rent-seeking and the Glorious Revolution in the English Atlantic economy’,
Economic History Review,  (), p. .
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Recent work on the companies has focused on the parliamentary delibera-
tions about the two companies’ charters from  onwards. This article
challenges historians’ views that the courts unstintingly supported the parlia-
mentary opposition to monopolistic charters. The  decision by the Court
of King’s Bench in Nightingale v. Bridges is said to have destroyed the Royal
African Company’s monopoly over the trade with Africa, including the slave
trade. In their opinion, it reversed the  decision in East India Company
v. Sandys, and ‘ended Royal authority to enforce prerogative grants of exclusive
economic privilege’. In reality, court decisions after  did not end the
foreign trade monopolies. Instead, they were costly but by no means decisive
skirmishes in the broader political war between the monopolies and their rivals
that had existed since the time of the Civil War. Powerful enforcement means
remained available after , including damages actions, requiring suspected
interlopers to post costly bonds before leaving England, and expensive customs
proceedings. The monopolies continued to use those tools and (in the East
India Company’s case) to authorize new seizures into the mid-s, with
support from King William III.Once ratiﬁed by parliament, these enforcement
powers would continue to aid the East India Company as its monopoly endured.
They would become much less relevant to the African Company once
interloping slave traders persuaded parliament largely to deregulate that trade.
This article’s focus on the changing constitutional vitality of enforcement
powers for overseas trading companies also shows that the seventeenth-century
struggle over the monopolies forms an important chapter in the history of the
law of property affected with a public interest. During it, English society
reassessed different forms of property interests (and related civil rights such as
jury trial) as they came into conﬂict in England and abroad, and struggled to
deﬁne why and in what circumstances they should be protected. But our
primary interest here is in understanding how and why the state resolved
these conﬂicts in the interest of empire. The article shows that at the centre of
the explanation for their strikingly divergent histories after  must be the
political structures of the two companies’ trades overseas as well as the very
different political forces which targeted their respective monopolies from
the s onwards. Notably, the East India Company had succeeded by 
in creating an embryonic English territorial government that could project
 Nightingale & Al’ v. Bridges,  English Reports (Eng. Rep.) ,  Eng. Rep. ,  Eng.
Rep. , Cases temp Eyre, Middle Temple Library (MTL) MS , p. .
 Steve Pincus, : the ﬁrst modern revolution (New Haven, CT, ), p. ; W. Darrell
Stump, ‘An economic consequence of ’, Albion,  (), pp. – (quotation at p. ).
 For studies of the struggle over the East India Company and Royal African Company
monopolies in parliament, see Henry Horwitz, ‘The East India trade, the politicians, and the
constitution: –’, Journal of British Studies,  (), pp. –; James Bohun,
‘Protecting prerogative: William III and the East India trade debate, –’, Past Imperfect,
 (), pp. –; and William A. Pettigrew, ‘Free to enslave: politics and the escalation of
Britain’s transatlantic slave trade, –’,William and Mary Quarterly,  (), pp. –.
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English power and its monopoly control abroad and provide military supplies at
home, while the African Company had not been able to do so.
As such, this comparative history of the two companies at a critical juncture
demonstrates that the Glorious Revolution was modern primarily because it
placed the interests of the English state above the ideologies that supported
and challenged the place of overseas trading companies in English society.
The Revolution represented the full ﬂowering of English nationally sponsored
mercantilist enterprises as a direct adjunct to the dynamic Williamite expansion
of English military power. In one case, the Revolution markedly broadened
and strengthened the foundation for English state-protected trade in slaves;
in the other, it ratiﬁed the state-protected monopoly of trade with Asia. But in
both cases, the principal end sought was the expansion of English imperial
power abroad, particularly through colonization and access to cheap raw
materials and exploitable commoditized labour.
I
Charles II established the Royal African Company in . The Royal African
Company charter granted it the right to enforce its monopoly by seizing and
forfeiting violators’ ships and goods, like the East India Company’s charter of
. But the African Company’s charter also contained several important
additional powers. First, it permitted the company to create its own courts using
company personnel and judges it chose to hear forfeitures and other
commercial proceedings. There was no appeal from these courts, unlike the
admiralty courts. And it permitted the company to enforce its monopoly
by requiring customs ofﬁcials to prohibit the importation to England and the
 An excellent treatment of the East India Company’s conception of itself as an extension of
the English government is Philip J. Stern, The company-state: corporate sovereignty & the early modern
foundations of the British empire in India (Oxford, ).
 So our conception of the modernity of the Glorious Revolution partly agrees with Steven
Pincus’s account. The Revolution was modern in compounding the centralization and
bureaucratization of political authority of the state, but not modern in terms of an ideological
break with the past. See Pincus, , p. .
 Half of any forfeiture’s proceeds went to the crown. But under the East India Company’s
charter prior to , such forfeitures could only have been enforced through royal admiralty
courts. Accordingly, there were important checks on its use of the forfeiture power. Admiralty
court decisions could be appealed to a court that by the mid-seventeenth century included
some common law judges. William S. Holdsworth, A history of English law ( vols., London,
–), I, pp. –. Admiralty’s jurisdiction was also statutorily limited and could be
contested in the common law courts. If it was improperly exercised, that abuse could be made
the subject of a damages action that included heavy penalties for violations. John H. Baker, An
introduction to English legal history (IELH) (th edn, London, ), p.  n. . Admiralty
courts proceeded under the civil law, not common law, which meant, inter alia, that they did
not ordinarily use juries. Ibid., pp. –.
 See n. . This same broadened authority was granted to the East India Company by letters
patent in . Stern, Company-state, pp. –.
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exportation to Africa of any goods whose sale would be in violation of the
monopoly.
As is well known, both the East India Company and the Royal African
Company monopolies were porous; both had limited success in enforcing
their monopolies. Prosperous, politically well-connected English interlopers
persistently sought to trade in violation of the monopolies, and were relatively
successful. This was not surprising, because the interlopers had important
allies – foreign trading companies; African, Asian, and West Indian ofﬁcials who
wanted to proﬁt from trade; and customers, including disgruntled plantation
owners in the West Indies who wanted more slaves at lower prices. The
companies were still periodically successful in seizing interlopers’ ships despite
such alliances. And although interloping interests could refer to common law
arguments, which viewed English property rights as internationally portable,
they had little success in challenging the legality or constitutional validity
of the monopolies’ enforcement powers in public during the s, though
occasionally successful colonial resistance did occur, as in the  St George
case. Interlopers sometimes complained to parliament and to the privy
council seeking redress, but without avail before .
By the late s, however, the Royal African Company’s seizure authority
had become sufﬁciently controversial that it sought legal advice from leading
London lawyers regarding the validity of its charter powers. These attorneys
were Thomas Turnor and Thomas Corbett (who in turn consulted Sir John
Maynard, and reported that he agreed with them). They concluded that the
charter was valid, and that the forfeiture authority it conferred was valid as
well. The extensive opinions of Turnor and Corbett rested primarily on the idea
 K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London, ), pp. –.
 Ibid., pp. –; Stern, Company-state, pp. –; Zahedieh, ‘Regulation’, pp. –.
 For the view that many English property and legal rights such as jury trial in essence
‘travelled with’ English merchants overseas, in the sense that they would be protected by
English courts against potentially tortious acts such as ship seizures made abroad or violations
of due process, see Sir John Maynard’s arguments in Skinner v. East India Company, T. B.
Howell, ed., A complete collection of state trials . . . from the earliest period to the year  with notes and
other illustrations: compiled by T. B. Howell . . . and continued from the year  to the present time: by
Thomas Jones Howell (State trials) ( vols., London, –), VI, pp. –, and the opinion of
the judges in that case; and Lincoln’s Inn Library, Maynard MSS, No. . In Skinner, however,
parliament reached an impasse and the issue was not resolved. English common law courts had
previously exercised jurisdiction over claims arising abroad using the legal ﬁction that the
events at issue had occurred in England. Baker, IELH, pp. –. In the St George case, when the
African Company petitioned the crown in  for reversal of the obviously ﬂawed 
St George court decision in which Jamaican courts had upheld the colony’s brazen effort to
evade the admiralty’s jurisdiction by conducting a trial regarding an African Company seizure
that violated well-established English legal principles, its petition appears to have fallen on deaf
ears. See The National Archives, Treasury Series  (T), vol. , fos. a–b; The National
Archives, Colonial Ofﬁce Series, vol. /; Zahedieh, ‘Regulation’, p.  n. .
 For these attempts see Edward Littleton, The groans of the plantations (London, ), p. ;
and Roger Coke, Reﬂections upon the East-Indy and Royal African Companies with animadversions,
concerning the naturalization of foreigners (London, ), p. .
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that foreign trade could be governed by the prerogative because in their view
English traders abroad were subject to the king’s authority to make foreign
law under the conquest rule of Calvin’s Case. Corbett’s opinion supported the
company’s right to prosecute interloping merchants as ‘Rebeles to the King’s
Authority’, quoting John Selden’s  tract Mare Clausum as a supportive
authority. Corbett added that its vice-admiralty courts were legal because they
would be located outside England where
the King alone may give to any Countryes conquered by him, what Lawes he pleaseth
which are not contrary to the Lawes of Nature, or to natural reason and also may
prescribe a way, manner, or course of Proceeding and Tryalls, different from
ye course of our common Lawes of this Land, but cannot doe soe in England.
Thomas Turnor added that the common law could not operate in Africa:
‘because the Common Law cannot run where Writs cannot be executed, and
Writs cannot be executed in this Territory for want of Sherrifs, and other like
Ofﬁcers, And none but ye King can constitute a Sherrif ’. Turnor contended that
‘the superinduction of ye Common Law into conquerd Countries is a Ray or
Emanation of ye King’s own free and spontaneous Grace and Favour vouchsaf’d
anon to his own very English Subjects . . . and no Right or Duty’. Here were
three respected lawyers validating the company’s forfeiture power by relying on
long-standing precedent that they thought permitted the crown to deny the
overseas application of the English common law in conquered countries.
Despite this informal support for the Royal African Company’s authority,
it and the East India Company knew that interlopers (and possibly the courts)
disagreed. Interloping merchants began to broaden their assault on the African
Company. The ﬁrst parliamentary petition against the company appeared
in . To limit such complaints and to decrease their enforcement costs,
the monopolies developed a powerful new enforcement tool that relied on
admiralty power but did not require forfeitures. Upon learning that a ship in
London was being loaded for a voyage that would violate its monopoly, that
company would obtain an admiralty order preventing the ship from sailing until
the owner posted a bond forfeitable if the voyage violated the monopoly.
Both companies used this enforcement strategy repeatedly. Its use resulted
in jurisdictional ﬁghts between the admiralty and the common law courts,
 The ‘conquest rule’ announced by Sir Edward Coke in his inﬂuential  report of
Calvin’s case, State trials, II, p. ,  Eng. Rep.  (), concerned what laws would govern
in conquered foreign dominions of the crown, and when and if such laws could be altered by
the king without the consent of parliament. The legal opinions discussed here assume that the
case’s principles would apply to English traders operating abroad, but that is by no means clear
from Coke’s report itself. For an outstanding analysis of the case see Daniel J. Hulsebosch,
‘The ancient constitution and the expanding empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British jurisprudence’,
Law and History Review,  (), pp. –.
 Opinion of Thos. Turnor, Gray’s Inn,  Dec. ; Opinion of Thos. Corbett,  (?)
including brief summary of oral opinion of Sir John Maynard, The National Archives, State
Papers Series (SP), vol. , fos. –.  SP /, fo.  [Jan.?, ].
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which led, on at least one occasion, to a prohibition order blocking an admiralty
proceeding. In an important / case, however, the king’s bench court
refused to issue a prohibition against an admiralty arrest of an interloper’s ship
made at the behest of the East India Company; the major judges of England
upheld its decision. At this time, the court of chancery also deliberately
blocked interlopers’ efforts to raise issues through discovery that would permit
them to challenge the Royal African Company monopoly. Throughout
the s, the Royal African Company and East India Company continued
to enforce their grants through seizures made abroad and use of admiralty
authority in London. In these circumstances, it was only a matter of time before
the East India Company would have to test the authority of its charter and
forfeiture power (and, in effect, that of the African Company as well) against
common law principles. In an early phase of the contest, Lord Keeper Sir
Francis North disparaged the Company’s forfeiture authority as the ‘weakest
clause in the patent’, and strongly implied it would have been better to leave
it out of a company enforcement action altogether.
Not surprisingly, when the East India Company took interloper Thomas
Sandys to the common law courts to obtain a determination of the validity of its
charter, it did so in a way designed to shield its forfeiture authority from attack.
It deliberately sought only damages from Sandys if its charter was upheld.
After lengthy argument by several of the most prominent lawyers in England
including John Holt, George Treby, and Henry Pollexfen, the court of king’s
bench upheld both the East India Company’s charter and its right to damages
to enforce it. The court squarely rejected the argument that Englishmen had
a common law right to engage in free trade that took precedence over the
king’s interest in controlling foreign affairs.
But the East India Company’s victory had important adverse implications for
the monopolies that must have been apparent to knowledgeable observers.
Even Chief Justice Jeffreys, a strong monarchist who ruled in favour of the East
India Company, concluded that although its forfeiture and imprisonment
 For examples for the Royal African Company use, see T/, pp. b–, . For a case
in which a prohibition was granted, see East India Co. v. Turkey Co., reprinted in D. E. C. Yale,
ed., Lord Nottingham’s chancery cases, II, Publications of the Selden Society, vol.  (), p. 
(Case ) (June  Car.  ()).
 Sands v. Exton (a/k/a Sandys and the East-India Company), Skinner ,  Eng. Rep. ,
T. Raymond ,  Eng. Rep. ,  Shower K. B. ,  Eng. Rep. . The East India
Company’s action was the subject of a successful tort claim in the s in Sands v. Child (below,
text at n. ). We thank Dr Michael R. T. Macnair for this reference.
 [Brooks v. Bradley], reprinted in Yale, ed., Lord Nottingham’s chancery cases, p.  (Case
) (Jan.  Car.  (/)); same case,  Ch. Cas.  ().
 East India Company v. Sandys,  Eng. Rep.  ().
 East India Co. v. Sandys, State trials, x, p. . The court’s upholding of the India Company
charter was also a victory for the Royal African Company, since by  the monopolies had
essentially the same powers and thus their charters had essentially the same strengths and
weaknesses. For further discussion of Sandys, see Pincus, , pp. –; and Stern, Company-
state, pp. –, passim.
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powers were not then at issue, ‘surely it would be hard to maintain all’ such
powers in the charter, and ‘therefore plaintiff ’s [East India Company’s] counsel
have avoided those questions by bringing this action’. In awarding the India
Company a victory, in other words, the chief justice chose to send a blunt
message about the limits of its authority.
The India Company nonetheless used its victory in Sandys to bring numerous
enforcement actions for damages against separate traders. By April ,
forty-ﬁve individuals, including Jeffrey Nightingale, the African interloper, had
petitioned the king to pardon their trading in violation of the East India
Company charter, and the Royal African Company took comfort in the court’s
judgement. But in one enforcement action, the lord keeper also expressed
grave doubts about the validity of the East India Company’s seizure powers,
saying ‘clauses to restrain trade under forfeitures have been adjudged void
about twenty times’.
So by the late s, the monopoly rights of crown-chartered trading
monopolies like the East India and Royal African Companies had been upheld
despite a strenuous, well-ﬁnanced challenge. They had also developed a
panoply of enforcement strategies: actions in royal admiralty courts requiring
interloping merchants to post bonds, customs proceedings, and vice-admiralty
company courts. These techniques received the blessing of inﬂuential lawyers,
and the courts themselves supported some of them, though signiﬁcant doubts
were cast on others. These enforcement tools relying on crown authority and
military force provided the underpinning that established sustained English
commercial activity in Africa and Asia. In these disputes, however, interloping
merchants developed important common law arguments to contest the
companies’ legal powers – especially the contention that common law rights,
including jury trials, existed wherever in the world English traders operated and
were not negated by the primacy of prerogative law overseas. These common
law arguments would receive a further hearing after the Glorious Revolution
of .
I I
After , the political and legal conﬂict between the interlopers and the
monopolies in both the African and Indian trades escalated sharply. Common
 East India Co. v. Sandys, State trials, x, p. .
 Scholars have equated the striking down of one method of monopoly enforcement with
the striking down of the monopoly as a whole. This article stresses the multiple enforcement
methods the overseas trading companies enjoyed. See Pincus, , p. .
 British Library, London, India Ofﬁce Records (IOR), H/.
 For the African Company’s comfort at the court’s outcome see ‘Minutes of the General
Court’,  Jan. , T/, fo. .
 East India Company v. Evans et al.,  Eng. Rep. ,  Vern.  (). The Company’s
damages theory in such actions was that separate traders should be compelled to contribute to
the cost of maintaining its Indian establishment.
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law courts would narrow the companies’ enforcement options, but court
decisions fell short of undermining all of their charter powers. Through a
collaborative legal strategy, the two companies sustained enough of their legal
authority to achieve parliamentary charter settlements.
By mid-, petitions had been ﬁled and impeachment proceedings were
pending in the House of Commons against admiralty and East India Company
ofﬁcials based on that company’s seizures. The monopolies were now also in a
position of having to defend their powers to new judges, many of whom had
been inﬂuential in forging the Revolution Settlement. Most prominent among
them was Sir John Holt, who became chief justice of the court of king’s bench.
Holt had defended the East India Company’s charter only a few years
previously. Taking these changed circumstances into account, when the India
Company faced its ﬁrst seizure challenge before Holt, it followed a shrewd legal
strategy.
In spring , in Beake v. Terrell, plaintiff challenged the India Company’s
seizure of a ship in the East Indies using a company court. The defendant ﬁrst
pled that the entire case was outside the king’s bench jurisdiction because it fell
squarely within the admiralty jurisdiction. But according to one case report,
that pleading failed ‘because the Common Law courts have a concurrent
jurisdiction with the Admiralty, and the plaintiff hath his election’. The
defendant then pleaded specially that ‘he was the King’s servant, and captain
and governor of such a man of war’; that ‘he seised the ship mentioned in the
declaration as a prize’, and that he seized it ‘super altum mare, within the
jurisdiction of the Admiralty’, after which an admiralty court in Swally ‘gave
sentence against the ship as a prize.’ The court then ruled on the legal
sufﬁciency of the pleadings.
Chief Justice Holt held that the defendant must plead a cause of forfeiture
before the ship could be taken as a prize, and that he needed to plead ‘to whom
the Court of Admiralty did belong’ (i.e., whether it was a foreign court, a
company court, or a crown court). Holt indicated that English common law
courts would defer to actions by foreign admiralty courts, strongly implying that
they would not defer to English admiralty courts. According to one report, he
also stated: ‘the subsequent going to the Admiralty cannot justify the ﬁrst illegal
caption’. Since the defendant’s plea did not meet these requirements, it was
insufﬁcient.
In Beake, through artful pleading the East India Company had offered Holt
the opportunity to sustain its seizure without speciﬁcally endorsing or needing
to justify it simply by disclaiming jurisdiction, thus deferring to royal authority.
 See ‘Papers relating to the charge of high misdemeanour . . . against Pepys . . . and . . .
Child’, Catalogue of RawlinsonMSS A (), Bodleian Library, Oxford, Sub. , itemNo. .
 See Beak v. Tyhrwit,  Eng. Rep.  (), which involved a similar defence.
  Eng. Rep. ;  Eng. Rep. ;  Eng. Rep. ;  Eng. Rep.  ().
  Eng. Rep.  ( W&M).   Eng. Rep. .
CON S T I T U T I N G COM P A N Y POW E R
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X14000107
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Lancaster University Library, on 21 May 2019 at 10:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core
Holt’s decision rejected that gambit and afﬁrmatively declared that the court
would review the legality of seizures, at least those affected using East India
company courts. More important, it would require the East India Company
to put its charter in issue to sustain a seizure as well. Quite probably because the
East India Company did not want to test the validity of its charter, it declined
to defend the case further.
At the same time as Beake v. Terrell, the Royal African Company was also forced
to account for its vice-admiralty forfeiture power before Holt’s court. Nightingale
v. Bridges was the earliest post-Revolution challenge to the African Company’s
monopoly, and was decided shortly after Beake. Plaintiffs Jeffrey Nightingale
(also an interloper in the India trade) and others challenged the seizure of
a ship by the African Company using a company court. The company was
represented in the ﬁrst phase of the case by prominent attorneys, Sir John
Somers, solicitor general and a staunch whig, and Sir George Treby, attorney
general (who had represented Sandys against the East India Company). Their
original strategy was diametrically opposed to the East India Company’s strategy
in Beake. They sought a clear ruling from the court on the legal validity of the
African Company’s charter and its seizure powers.
To do this, they ‘importuned’ the court to make its decision based on a
procedure referred to as a ‘special verdict’. Under that procedure, a jury would
ﬁrst be required to determine the facts of the controversy, but the court would
then rule separately on their legal signiﬁcance (including the charter’s validity).
But the company then dramatically changed its strategy in the middle of the
case. After the jury in Nightingale had returned their factual verdict, the
defendants declined to appear in court to argue its legal signiﬁcance. This
gave the court no alternative but to rule for the plaintiff, but to do so, the law
required it ﬁrst to conclude that the plaintiff had a valid legal claim. From the
reports of the court’s decision, it is virtually impossible to say with certainty what
the court thought made Nightingale’s claim a valid one.
 After Beake obtained a judgement against it for damages, the East India Company
authorized settlement of Beake’s claim in late . IOR/B Court of Committees minutes,
 Dec.  (fos. –). Sir Benjamin Bathurst, also an African Company ofﬁcial, was named
as the Indian Company negotiator.
 Nightingale & Al’ v. Bridges,  Eng. Rep. ,  Eng. Rep. ,  Eng. Rep. ; Cases
temp Eyre, MTL MS , p. . Nightingale began in late ; although there is some conﬂict in
the dating of various reports, judgement appears to have been given in mid-.
 Although there is no documentary evidence on this point, there is a strong possibility that
they adopted this frontal strategy because they thought that Holt would favour the African
Company, since he had represented the India Company in Sandys.
 Stump and Pincus read what Nightingale’s attorney, Bartholomew Shower, proposed to
say (if the company had defended its position) and the nineteenth-century summary of the case
into Holt’s judgement (the precise details of which are not known). See Stump, ‘An economic
consequence of ’, pp. –; and Pincus, , pp. –.
 They did attack the jury verdict as inconsistent with the original pleadings, but this seems
to have been largely a delaying action.
 W I L L I A M A . P E T T I G R EW AND G EO R G E W . VA N C L E V E
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X14000107
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Lancaster University Library, on 21 May 2019 at 10:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core
One thing we can be conﬁdent of, however, is that the court did not think
that its decision invalidated the Royal African Company’s charter as a whole.
After all, the plaintiff ’s lawyer Sir Bartholomew Shower said in his own detailed
account of his argument in the case that he was not challenging the charter
itself.Other evidence conﬁrms this. A recently discovered unpublished report
of Nightingale says that the special verdict was intended to determine the ‘validity
of the Charter of the African Company for seizing [ships] and goods trading
there without the leave of the Company’. This conﬁrms Shower’s statement –
that the plaintiff did not challenge the charter in toto, but only the African
Company’s forfeiture authority. The report continues, saying that ‘the Plaintiff ’s
Counsel did wave’ that point and ‘would not argue being so clearly against
Law’. In the event, because the defendant subsequently challenged only
speciﬁc pleadings in the case in an attempt to limit its liability for damages,
the court did not need to decide the validity of prerogative forfeiture authority
generally.
Whether Nightingale held that all prerogative forfeitures (including those
through the admiralty), or only those effected through company courts, were
unlawful, remains uncertain. The case itself did not raise that broader issue,
since it concerned only company court forfeiture. The most that can be said
with certainty is that Nightingale did decide that English common law protected
the property of English foreign traders against prerogative company court
seizures, and did not decide that the Royal African Company charter was
invalid.
The evidence suggests that the earlier decision in Beake explains the African
Company’s dramatic change in strategy. The two companies had overlapping
ofﬁcials and stockholders, so they were each well aware of litigation challenging
the charters of either monopoly. There is clear evidence of co-ordination
between them on important matters such as taxation during this period.
Beake had already demonstrated clearly that Holt’s court would not uphold
company court seizures. Like the East India Company, the African Company
  Show. K. B. ,  Eng. Rep. .
 Cases temp Eyre, MTL MS No. , p. . This report is dated Trinity Term,  W&M.,
indicating that Nightingale continued through mid-.
 Ibid. This statement is confusing for two reasons. First, if anyone were going to waive the
issue of validity of the Royal African Company’s forfeiture authority, one would expect it to be
the defendant, not the plaintiff. The report may merely garble Shower’s concession that he was
not challenging the validity of the monopoly itself, only its forfeiture authority. Second, it is not
clear whether the statement that the forfeiture authority was ‘so clearly against Law’ was
Shower’s contention, or the reporter’s editorial comment.
 But other contemporary decisions show that this reasoning applied only to traders, not to
English subjects living abroad. See Blankard v. Galdy,  Eng. Rep.  (); Dutton v. Howell,
 Eng. Rep.  (), where courts held that English law did not apply in various colonies.
 As mentioned, Sir Benjamin Bathurst, the EIC’s negotiator in the Beake case, was also a
major RAC ofﬁcial and stockholder. Other examples could be given, including Sir Thomas
Cooke, George Bohun (Bathurst’s nephew), and Sir William Hodges.
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had no desire to put its charter in issue to defend a seizure that had also
occurred through a company court, so defendants declined to argue the special
verdict.
Ultimately, Holt’s judgement forced the company to pay £, damages
plus £  s d costs to Nightingale. However, it is mistaken to view settlement
of such seizure claims by either monopoly as total losses for them as some
historians have, because the substantial seizure efforts by the companies during
the s and s had clearly deterred some competition and maintained
proﬁts while they had Stuart support. More importantly, even after
Nightingale, both the African and East Indian Companies continued to enforce
their monopolies. Of the two, the African chose less aggressive but still effective
methods.
First, the African Company instructed colonial representatives to use customs
laws rather than its charter powers to effect seizures of interlopers’ ships and
goods. It wrote to Nathaniel Johnson, governor of Antigua, in February 
commending him on his report of the seizure and condemnation of ‘sixty
Negroes’ in Montserrat, adding that it hoped that this example would
discourage interlopers from seeking to smuggle slaves into any of the Leeward
Islands. It reminded Johnson that ‘Governors make use of ’ the Acts of
Navigation to ‘seise Interloping Negroes for their neglect in making due entries
of their Ships which ways of seizure we like best being more advantageous to the
Government of the Plantations [which receive reward money] and to us makes
the same effect (by discouraging the interloping trade)’. It also recommended
that colonial ofﬁcials prosecute the master and owner of ships who made false
customs entries since that would violate its charter.
But concern about its charter’s validity had tempered the Royal African
Company’s position by late . As it explained to its Jamaica factors, Charles
Penhallow and Walter Ruding,
Should any Interloping Ships come to your Island we would have you Endeavour to
have them & their Cargoes Seized by the Custome house ofﬁcers . . . we had rather
loose our Claime to any Part [of the reward money] than be lyable to have the
powers in our Charter tryed at this time.
By March , after the initial ruling against it in Nightingale, the African
Company instructed its colonial agents not to pursue charter seizures.
 Instead, probably as a delaying tactic, they sued out a writ of error to the Exchequer
Chamber, appealing the King’s Bench verdict, but it does not appear that that appeal was
pursued. See Fowles v. Bridges,  Eng. Rep.  (), where the company sought to resist
enforcement of the judgement against it based on its appeal, and lost.
 Davies, Royal African Company, p. .
 T/ (n.p.), Royal African Company to Christopher Robinson, Virginia,  Feb.
/?
 T/ (n.p.), Royal African Company to Nathaniel Johnson,  Feb. .
 T/ (n.p.), Royal African Company to Penhallow and Ruding,  Dec. .
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The company told them that it desired continued enforcement under the
customs laws: ‘In some places Negroes . . . have been seized and condemned for
the use of their Majesty which in some measure answers our ends of
discouraging such traders.’
Second, the Royal African Company agreed to provide licences for a fee to
interlopers who agreed to respect its monopoly. While historian Kenneth Davies
saw the declining premium charged for such licences in the s as a sign of
the end of the monopoly, in reality each paid licence represented a decision by
a separate trader that it was more efﬁcient to pay for it than to try to violate the
monopoly. The declining premium for licences – which went from a high of 
per cent in the s, when royal support was at its peak, to  per cent in the
s, when the parliamentary debate was at its height, reﬂected the fact that its
monopoly had been weakened in court and in parliament. But the continuing
licence payments also represented recognition by separate traders that they had
not found a way to invalidate the monopoly. And the Indian Company’s far
more aggressive enforcement actions even after losing separate trader lawsuits
suggest that even the seizure concessions made by the African Company were
far more reﬂective of the weaknesses of its speciﬁc political base and ﬁnances
than they were of any adverse effects on the monopolies from the ﬁrst round of
court decisions.
The ﬁnal nail in the cofﬁn for the crown’s prerogative forfeiture authority
came in . In Dockwray v. Dickenson, plaintiff William Dockwra recovered
damages due to an African Company seizure that was allegedly based directly on
an order of Charles II in the s. Chief Justice Holt held that the king’s
seizure order was illegal, and that anyone who operated under an unlawful royal
order accepted the risk of liability. That clearly implied that future East India or
African Company seizures under William III’s authority would also be held
unlawful.
By the late s, then, Holt and the courts took the view that English
common law protections for property rights against prerogative seizure powers
should apply to Englishmen trading abroad. Extending these protections
weakened monopoly enforcement, indirectly supporting free trade. The court’s
eradication of the African Company’s forfeiture power represented a blow
to the enforceability of the company’s monopoly. More so than Nightingale
v. Bridges, Dockwray v. Dickenson encouraged interloping in the slave trade. In
, no interlopers embarked on slave trading voyages (though the company
 T/ (n.p.) Royal African Company to Parsons,  Mar. .
 Davies, Royal African Company, pp. –.
  Eng. Rep. ,  Eng. Rep. .
 In , Holt and the other major judges of England had explicitly endorsed the position
that slaves would be considered as merchandize in international trade. For discussion of Holt’s
decisions and the evolution of the law on the legality of slavery in England itself, see George
Van Cleve, ‘Somerset’s case and its antecedents in imperial perspective’, Law and History Review,
 (), pp. –, at pp. –.
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assembled twenty-one cargoes bound for Africa). In , only one did
(the company made seven voyages in ). By , once the implications of
the Dockwray decision had become clear to watchful observers, independent
slave traders embarked on nineteen slave trading voyages (compared with eight
by the company). Striking down a powerful enforcement mechanism of the
Royal African Company’s monopoly resulted in a dramatic increase in the scale
of transatlantic human trafﬁcking. Ironically, the Dockwray decision meant that
courts accepted that when engaged in foreign trading, including the slave trade,
‘English-Men . . . carry the Rights of such along with them’ at the same time that
they were deciding that colonial subjects, often also English natives, lacked
such rights, and that slaves could be treated as property in international trade.
These legal principles formed an integral part of the pluralist legal structure
on which the horrors of African slavery in the Americas were founded.
In expanding the protection of traders’ property, they offered common law
legitimacy to the slave trade nearly a century before the common law would
provide a rallying cry for the trade’s abolition.
I I I
The prerogative charters’ weakened legal standing by the mid-s had led
both companies to intensify their efforts to buttress their charters through
statutory endorsement. The East India Company was better able to sustain the
blow inﬂicted on its forfeiture powers because it successfully courted the
inﬂuence and protection of the new monarch, King William III. The Royal
African Company had attempted to curry such royal favour by gifting shares. As
a matter of course, instructions to colonial governors during the reign of
William III continued to include the expectation that they would assist in
supporting the Royal African Company’s monopoly. Governors rarely followed
these orders. Although he sought its military assistance, King William would not
use his power to support the African Company’s monopoly. By the reign of
Queen Anne, the monarchy overtly shunned the African Company’s requests
for protection.
The king’s favour for the East India Company by contrast was conspicuous
and enabled that company to augment its weakened enforcement powers
 See the estimates in The trans-Atlantic slave trade database (voyages data set), ‘Estimates’
spreadsheet (), www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/download.faces#extended. This in-
valuable data source makes no claim to be comprehensive.
 W. A. [William Atwood], An apology for the East India Company: with an account of some large
prerogatives of the crown of England, anciently exercised and allowed of in our law, in relation to trade and
foreign parts (London, ), p. ; n. , above.
 For the African Company’s gift to William III of company shares worth £,, see
Minutes of the General Court,  Jan. , T/, fo. . For its gift to Queen Anne and
her subsequent refusal to ‘meddle’ in the affairs of the African Company, see Minutes of the
Court of Assistants,  June , T/, n.p.; Davies, Royal African Company, p. ; T/,
‘Instruction to Captain John Hosea,  December, ’, fo. .
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with the continued potency of the post-Revolution monarchy. By early , the
East India Company believed that it would receive conﬁrmation from the crown
that its existing charter was legally valid. Even before receiving conﬁrmation,
it issued new seizure commissions speciﬁcally for English ships. Its instructions
to Captain William Freake of  January  explicitly authorized seizure
of ‘all English interlopers & all other English ships and Vessells whatsoever . . .
sailing or trading in India without our Pass or Licence’. Then on  February
, the East India Company’s governor reported to the court of committees:
That on Thursday night last . . . [T]he Lords of the Cabinet-Councill were pleased to
acquaint them That his Majestie had taken the opinion of all the Judges touching
the Company’s Charter, who had declared that the Same was good in Law, and that
the Company had a right to the East India Trade . . . Yet that his Majestie was desirous
to know, What the Company had to offer towards their Settlement.
The essence of the Glorious Revolution is seen in this minute: William III
sought ﬁnancial recompense in exchange for his constitutional support.
Contributions to his war against Louis XIV could provide constitutional
protection for the East India Company. In extended negotiations with the
company, William’s support for the charter was explicitly used as leverage,
especially with regards to its supplying of materiel. For example, the East India
Company negotiated with William over such fundamentally important issues as
whether and at what speciﬁc price and credit terms the company would supply
the crown with large quantities of imported saltpetre, a critical war material,
to use in his war with France.
From the company’s perspective, conﬁrmation by the judges constituted
crown authorization to resume its enforcement operations using its former
methods. Unlike the African Company, it had never revoked its prior seizure
commissions, so far as is known. The same day that the governor’s report was
made to the court of committees, the company began issuing additional new
seizure commissions to its captains. On  February , it issued a
commission to Captain William Wildey of the ship Modena and other captains
to seize English interlopers.
Similarly, with the assistance of William III’s ofﬁcials, the East India Company
continued in the s to prohibit ships from leaving England unless they ﬁrst
posted bonds forfeitable if they violated the monopoly. In the most notorious
incident of this kind, in , an admiralty ofﬁcial issued an order blocking
the interloper ship Redbridge from leaving London. This resulted in the passage
of a resolution (proposed by the India and African interloper and merchant
grandee, Gilbert Heathcote) by the House of Commons asserting that all
British subjects had a right to leave England to trade. But contrary to the view
sometimes taken that that resolution reversed the Sandys decision, it had
 IOR/E//, fo. .  IOR/B/, fo. .
 See, e.g., IOR/B/, fos. –.  IOR/E//, fo. .
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no legal effect. The House of Lords did not support it, and William III did
not acquiesce to the House’s position.
This parliamentary resolution was to have more political effect on the Royal
African Company than it did on the East India Company because the former
lacked the support of the monarchy. Independent slave traders interpreted
this resolution as evidence of parliamentary countenance for an entirely
deregulated trade. This was a legal ﬁction. But from this point on, the African
Company nevertheless staked its future on its ability to achieve a statute to
support its monopoly. It had to pursue this strategy, unlike the East India
Company, without crown support. All the African Company’s lobbying
opponents had to do to sustain a deregulated slave trade was block the
company’s attempts.
Despite courtroom qualiﬁcations to the crown prerogative to support its
monopoly companies’ enforcement mechanisms, the crown helped the East
India Company to continue to defend its monopoly. William III and the East
India Company were undeterred from their aggressive enforcement policy even
when the East India Company lost a  court action that challenged the
admiralty’s power to block the exit of interloper ships until they gave bond. That
case, Sands v. Child, held that the Admiralty had exceeded its statutory authority
when it demanded bonds from ships in England that would be forfeitable if
the ship violated a monopoly’s rights, and awarded substantial damages against
the East India Company on that basis. But the decision failed to persuade
William III to end his support for the company’s seizure powers. When he
issued a new charter to the East India Company in  and made ﬁnal
revisions to it in , the new charter did not in any way limit the enforcement
authority that the East India Company had exercised under its earlier charters.
Its issuance occurred despite the persistent efforts of the separate traders to
have the charter blocked or modiﬁed both in parliament and in the privy
council. The Royal African Company, on the other hand, continued to face
legacy actions for its Stuart-era seizures.
Within two years of Dockwray v. Dickenson, the East India and the Royal African
Company had entered into parliamentary settlements that restructured their
charters. In , a bidding war had broken out between different trader
factions seeking control of the East India Company. In the consequent India
Company parliamentary restructuring, stockholding was required to be
expanded substantially to permit interlopers to buy into the company. But
parliament preserved the company’s monopoly and accepted that the East
India Company needed effective means to enforce it. Once the East India
Company’s opponents were able to force the company to let them invest, it was
in their interest for it to maintain its monopoly and to have strong enforcement
 Stern, Company-state, p. .
 Considerations relating to the African bill (London, ), p. .
  Eng. Rep. ,  Eng. Rep. ,  Eng. Rep. ,  Eng. Rep. ,  Eng. Rep. .
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powers for it. Gaining a share of the rich monopoly’s proﬁts was the real object
of attacks on the India Company’s enforcement actions by the dominant
faction of interlopers, not any pretextual concern for free competition or
property rights.
In sharp contrast, the Royal African Company monopoly was restructured
through what amounted to a compulsory licensing scheme that permitted
greatly expanded competition in the slave trade and dramatically expanded the
slave trade as a result. The Trade to Africa Act of  provided statutory
endorsement for the African Company, but also legitimized independent
slave trading. The Act stipulated that independent slave traders would pay
a  per cent duty on the value of their exports to Africa. Bearing in mind
the legal restrictions on the company’s enforcement powers in Nightingale
and in Dockwray and taking into account the African interlopers’ repeated
efforts to deregulate the African trade completely, this statute conﬁrms the
continued, albeit limited, political capital of the African Company.
Taken together, these two divergent parliamentary resolutions to the legal
disputes about the companies’ monopolies in the s conﬁrm that the
Glorious Revolution was no crusade against monopoly or for free trade. The two
constitutional sides of the Revolution – prerogative and statute – could enhance
the unreformed, pre-Revolution prerogative as champions of overseas trading
monopolies. The courts provided some assistance to the interlopers by
supporting their common law right to be free from prerogative seizure of
their property, and hence indirectly their ability to trade in violation of the
monopolies. But the monopolies retained considerable enforcement powers
for much of the period until the fundamental decisions about what form of
economic organization would most strongly enhance national revenue and
military power were made by the king and parliament. By , the interloping
East India merchants had formed their own company and then united with the
old company with the enthusiastic blessing of the state. By , the provisions
of the Trade to Africa Act had expired and fully independent British slave
trading received the blessing of public opinion.
I V
What explains these differing outcomes for the Indian and African trades?
Since their formal enforcement powers, as this article has shown, rose and fell
together, an answer cannot be found in the legal disputes both companies
endured before or after . The profound difference in parliament’s
treatment of competition with the African and East India Companies appears
 The catastrophic failure of the statutory South Sea Company as a rival prop for the state’s
ﬁnances to the East India Company and as an alternative slave trading monopoly to the Royal
African Company conﬁrms the extent to which the East India Company had cemented its
position in state ﬁnance and how much the lobbying opponents of the African Company had
ensured free and open access to the growing market in transatlantic human trafﬁcking.
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more to be the result of two intersecting factors: the contrasting public proﬁle
of the two companies, and the different political and economic circumstances
the two companies encountered overseas. We conclude this article with some
exploratory comparisons of these differing circumstances.
After the Glorious Revolution, parliamentary deliberation became central
to the way the state regulated the national economy. This ensured that the
public’s perception of the two trades inﬂuenced their respective fortunes
as monopolies. Both monopolies derived an important part of their public
justiﬁcation from the understanding that they provided the English state with
a means of imposing its interests on what seventeenth-century culture believed
to be barbarian foreign states. But whether a monopoly company was
viewed as an effective vessel for the state’s coercive power depended on whether
or not the company was in a position to develop durable commercial
relationships in its overseas trading arena. Here, the East India Company
outperformed its African sibling. Public scrutiny of the Royal African Company
from the s onwards forced that company to justify its traditional
monopoly argument before a political constituency that was rising in inﬂuence
and assertiveness: that representing the American plantations and Atlantic
trade. With growing power, the beneﬁciaries of a largely deregulated British
Atlantic economy rejected the traditional conception of a monopoly company
as a vessel for state power and suggested instead that the rules of trade ought to
satisfy ‘national’ criteria: that is, the more people who could enjoy access to the
trade the better.
The African and East India companies faced overseas trading environments
that presented many of the same commercial challenges. Both companies
concentrated their endeavours on manipulating the supply curves of local
trading goods: primarily textiles and spices from India and slaves from Africa.
Neither company could consistently use its trading monopoly to impose
prices on the African and Indian merchants they dealt with. Faced with small
and often warring states at the coastal peripheries they operated in and
always beset by rival European trading companies and interlopers, both
companies struggled to obtain the commercial advantages their monopolies
were designed to achieve during the seventeenth or early eighteenth
centuries.
 See Charles Davenant, Reﬂections upon the constitution and management of the African trade,
etc., in Charles Whitworth, ed., The political and commercial works of that celebrated writer Charles
D’Avenant, LL.D. . . ., v (London, ), pp. –. For Davenant’s advocacy for the East India
Company see Charles Davenant, Memorial concerning the coyn (London, ).
 The literature on both companies makes constant references to their respective ofﬁcials
trying and failing to impose prices and use their monopoly power. See (for the African
Company) John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the making of the modern world (Cambridge,
), p. ; and Davies, Royal African Company, p. ; and (for the East India Company)
K. N. Chaudhuri, The trading world of Asia and the English East India Company, –
(Cambridge, ), p. .
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A clear difference in the politics of their local trade existed, however. This
prevented the Royal African Company from implementing what was basically
the same commercial strategy as the East India Company: to build and then use
forts and the threat of force to commandeer trading and then local revenue
concessions to supplement uncertain income from trade. In the West African
case, many small states operated in a dynamic equilibrium that sustained the
slave trade as perpetual war helped to improve the supply of slaves. This
equilibriummeant that there was no incentive for each African polity to develop
lasting commercial alliances with the many rival European companies and
growing numbers of independent traders who swarmed along the African coast
during this period.
The East India Company in contrast proved adept at establishing durable
alliances and territorial footholds in India. The existence of a single centralizing
empire on the Indian subcontinent – the Mughal empire – at times threatened
the company but, on the whole, assisted its position. The East India Company
learned to prioritize commercial arenas more distant from the Mughal state’s
extractive impulses; shifting operations in the course of the seventeenth century
away from the Mughal’s commercial centre at Surat and towards peripheral
ports like Madras and Bombay. These ports would become quasi-independent
commercial city-states, which allowed the East India Company to concentrate
local trading populations to sustain its supply of trade goods and then build a
resource for local revenue raising. These local merchants often allied with the
English to protect themselves from the Mughal empire. The pioneering
example of this strategy was that followed at Madras. The East India Company
received the right to develop a fort and then a town at the Coromandel Coast
from local, non-Mughal rulers. As war continued, local merchants valued the
commercial safe haven that the English town provided.
A comparison between Madras and the Royal African Company’s principal
trading station at Cape Coast is instructive. Without a dominant state power to
appeal to, defend against, or negotiate with (such as the Mughal empire) the
Royal African Company could not achieve lasting alliances with any local West
African polities. Without such an alliance, its expensive forts would represent a
cost disadvantage rather than the useful commercial infrastructure they were
designed to be. Independent traders could trade without these cost disadvan-
tages and could respond to rapidly changing commercial conditions on the
coast faster than the companies. The two town’s population levels in this period
 This is a vast and complex subject and we can add little to it here other than what can be
illuminated by some preliminary but strongly suggestive comparisons between the two
company’s overseas trading environments.
 M.N. Pearson, ‘Merchants and states’, in James D. Tracy, ed., The political economy of
merchant empires (Cambridge, ), pp. –. See also Sinnappah Arasaratnam, Merchants,
companies, and commerce on the Coromandel coast, – (Oxford, ), pp. , ;
Chaudhuri, The trading world of Asia, p. ; I. B. Watson, Foundation for empire: English private trade
in India, – (New Delhi, ), p. .
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conﬁrm the different reception the two companies received. The African
Company could not attract local population to its settlement. While Madras
increased in size from a few thousand to almost one hundred thousand from
the mid-seventeenth century to the early eighteenth, Cape Coast remained a
small town of a few thousand throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Nor could the African Company build a local resource of taxation
or establish a hinterland of plantations (as they sought to do). This costly
development failure proved a huge boon to African interlopers.
Unlike the East India Company, the Royal African Company had to manage
two contrasting overseas trading contexts simultaneously: the East Atlantic
African context and the West Atlantic American. Enforcing its monopoly as well
as its commercial interests proved as difﬁcult in British America as it did on the
West coast of Africa. The company’s difﬁculties in Africa and its marked
unpopularity in America would both become liabilities for it in parliament. The
African Company built its public case in parliament with reference to the need
for coercive monopoly power in Africa. The company lost state support and
failed to gather public support because of the public, political interventions
against it by an impressive transatlantic phalanx of interests sympathetic to an
unregulated Atlantic trade. The Royal African Company faced continued
opposition from English colonists who wanted more slaves at cheaper prices;
and they in turn had the support of inﬂuential British creditors who needed
proﬁtable plantations to recoup their investments.
The parliamentary opposition to the two companies overlapped in important
ways. Some of the same merchants attacked the charters of both companies
simultaneously. Both anti-company lobbies operated like ﬂuid coalitions whose
membership and political strategies altered throughout the long fought anti-
monopoly campaigns in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
There were important differences of emphasis in the two campaigns, however.
At times, these differences reﬂected the contrasting features of the two trades.
As one opponent of the Royal African Company put it, noting the uniﬁcation of
the two East Indian Companies in , monopolistic organization of overseas
trade made strategic sense for the Indian trade but not for the African:
The Reason for doing the one [monopolizing the East India trade], is the true
Reason for not doing the other [the African trade]; because the Exports to India
being Bullion, and the Imports from thence consisting of such Commodities as very
much interfere with the Manufactures of Great Britain, therefore such a Trade
ought to be conﬁned to but one Exporter and one Importer . . . But in the African
 Davies, Royal African Company, pp. , , . For the African Company’s inability
(and European inability in general) to develop territorial holdings at the expense of local
African polities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see David Eltis, The rise of African
slavery in the Americas (Cambridge, ), p. . For a speciﬁc and sustained attempt to do so,
see the career of the Royal African Company’s leading ofﬁcial at Cape Coast, Sir Dalby Thomas:
David Henige, ‘“Companies are always ungrateful”’: James Phipps of Cape Coast, a victim of the
African trade’, African Economic History,  (), p. .
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Trade, the Exports consisting of the Woollen and other Manufactures of Great
Britain, and the Imports consisting of Gold, Elephants Teeth, and Hands absolutely
necessary for raising the Productions of our Plantations, of much more Advantage to
us than Gold or Silver, ’tis better, doubtless, to open such a Trade to ten thousand
Exporters and Importers, than conﬁne it to one Person or Company exclusive.
It was therefore easier to pitch political opposition to the Royal African
Company as a national cause céle`bre. Overall, broad and vociferous opposition
to the African Company’s monopoly channelled the widespread belief that the
company proposed to limit access to necessities and restrict the sale of English
staples. Opposition to the East India Company, however, was itself limited in
breadth by the perception that it exported and imported precious luxuries.
A greater percentage of the anti-African opinion therefore cited the need for a
totally deregulated trade. Some Indian interlopers developed a free trade
argument, but once the English state had authorized the formation of two rival
companies in the mid-s, the possibility of a free trade to India did not
inspire many petitions. Instead, Indian interlopers more often ﬁxated on
forming a new company or on compelling the existing company to allow them
to buy into it, or reform the structure of the company from joint stock to a
regulated company. These positions were less likely to ignite the passions of
large numbers of disinterested parliamentary petitioners, since they promised
continued higher prices. The campaign to liberate the slave trade from the
African Company’s monopoly proved to be broader-based than the forces
antagonistic to the old East India Company’s monopoly. Independent traders to
Africa enjoyed persistent petitioning support from trading, manufacturing,
planting, and civic interests in literally dozens of English towns and American
colonies. No such spontaneous alliance of provincial and colonial interests
assembled to assault the East India Company on behalf of the popular principle
of free trade.
To match its easier means of acting as a company-state in India, the East India
Company’s lobbying strategy sought to privilege cultivating the countenance
of the state rather than public opinion. That support was best secured either
through bribery or by providing loans to the government during wartime (both
of which the East India Company engaged in, and both of which its opponents
either clearly engaged in or probably engaged in as well). The still powerful
monarchy of William III desperately craved ﬁnancial support for the war against
Louis XIV, and the East India Company and its rivals proposed to assist him. They
also understood the lucrative potential of extending future government loans.
 The case of the separate traders to Africa . . . [London? ?], p. .
 Stern, Company-state, pp. , . Some also objected to the personal slights the company
had meted out to them.
 For a rare example, see ‘A petition of the clothiers, and woollen manufacturers, in the
county of Gloucester’,  Feb. , in Journals of the House of Commons (London, ),
XI, p. .
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The intercession of William III did the most to save the East India Company
monopoly. This appeared to some to threaten the spirit of the constitutional
settlement of . Some observers were disgusted after a Revolution
celebrating the constitutional supremacy of parliament allowed the new king to
bully parliament into sustaining amonopoly over English trade with India.The
deregulation of the slave trade and the escalation of American slavery, however,
appeared to champion the constitutional primacy of parliament.
This comparison of the conjoined legal status of the Royal African and East
Indian Companies in the ﬁnal quarter of the seventeenth century and their
divergent fortunes from the early eighteenth century illustrates the Janus-faced
repercussions of the Glorious Revolution for commercial monopolies. The
Revolution allowed a public parliamentary platform for slave traders to destroy
the African Company’s monopoly over the slave trade. But it also encouraged
the new king to seek the proﬁts and strategic commodities of Indian trade to
buttress the imperial state’s ﬁnances and military might. The constitutional
reforms broadly associated with the Glorious Revolution then did not either
exclusively encourage the liberalization of the English economy or solely
foster greater protectionism as various historians have argued. The Glorious
Revolution was, at heart, a large-scale transaction d’état, which involved the
selling of constitutional privileges for the cost of ﬁghting a religious war. The
African Company’s monopoly was dissolved by the loss of these privileges and
the East India Company’s was upheld by the necessities of war. Both monopolies
were also subject to the policy choices of non-Europeans (and those based in
America). Their shared legal powers and strategies belie the different relation-
ships both companies were able to secure with state sovereignty at home and
abroad. The East India Company was able to graft itself to the British state and
to operate as a state overseas. The African Company became divorced from the
British state and failed to develop much sovereignty in its overseas markets. The
slave trade, as a result, accelerated as it supplied the labour-hungry decentred
market of the Atlantic world.
 A staunch anti-monopolist, Roger Coke resented the use of statute to support an East
India Company he believed reversed some of the constitutional reforms of the Glorious
Revolution. See Roger Coke, An apology for the English nation: viz that it is as much the interest
for the English nation, that the trades to the East Indies and Africk, should be free as that to Spain
[London, ?], p. .
 For the long-held and still prominent tradition that the Glorious Revolution liberated
overseas trade, see above, and William James Ashley, Surveys historic and economic (London,
), pp. –; Robert Ekelund and Robert Tollison, Politicised economies (Texas, TX,
); Christopher Hill, The century of Revolution: – (London, ); Hilton Root, The
fountain of privilege: political foundations of markets in old regime France and England (London,
), pp. –; and most recently, Pincus, , pp. , . For those who see the rise of
protectionism and the survival of ‘rent seeking’, see, for example, Edwin Cannan, ed., Adam
Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (Chicago, ), II, pp. –,
–; Ralph Davis, ‘The rise of protection in England’, Economic History Review,  (),
p. ; and Zahedieh, ‘Regulation’, pp. –.
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